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Predicting the Future of Employment Law:
Reflecting or Refracting Market Forces?
STEWART J. SCHWAB*

In this Article I predict how employment law will change in the future. My task is
positive rather than normative. I will not argue that the developments I foresee are
good ones to be applauded. Rather, they arise "inevitably" from the way the law will
react to changes in labor markets.
Of course, as Professor Ronald Dworkin emphasizes, in developing atheory of law
one cannot sharply distinguish between the positive and normative.' Dworkin points
out that even in describing the current legal framework, one must choose what to
highlight and what to ignore, a process based on values.2 When predicting the future,
the winnowing process is even more value laden. Karl Marx's predictions about the
future of capitalism (which at their core involved changes in employment
relationships) had this mixed positive and normative quality. In much of his writing,
Marx argued in a positive predictive vein that the rise and fall of capitalism was
predestined by historical forces In other writings, Marx normatively applauded the
trends he foresaw and tried to hasten their arrival.'
To preview mybottom line, I will predict as a positive manner that employment law
in the future will pay more attention to efficiency concerns, to the need for firms and
economies to be competitive, and to the costs as well as benefits of employment
regulation. Those who know my prior work may be skeptical that I disclaim any
normative applauding of such trends. At this point, I simply acknowledge the
intertwined nature of hope and prediction.
I. A THEORY OF PREDICTION
Hindsight is 20/20. Explaining past changes in employment law is easier than
predicting the future. Takejust one example: In the 1980s, a number of states enacted
stakeholder statutes that allowed or required corporate directors to consider the
interests of workers and communities as well as shareholders.' Who could have
predicted this flurry of legislative activity? After the fact, most people saw this as

Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I thank Kevin Clermont, Matt Finkin, and
Stephen Garvey for suggestions, and Sam Estreicher and Ken Dau-Schmidt for urging me to
undertake the piece.
1. RONALD M. DWORKN, LAw's EMPrE 34-35 (1986).
*

2. Id. at 52-53.
3. See, e.g., Robert C. Tucker, Introduction: The Writings ofMarx andEngels, in THE
MARX-ENGELs READER, at xvi (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1972) (explaining that, according to

Marx and Engels, the Marxist'"materialist conception ofhistoryhad conclusivelydemonstrated'
that the human historical process was moving toward a worldwide anticapitalist revolution that
would usher in socialism or communism").
4. See id. at xxix (explaining that Marx hoped his theorizing was "actively influencing
historical events").
5. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d) (West 1989); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602
(Michie 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(3)(d) (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §

302A.251(5) (West 1985).
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predictable, if not inevitable. Some applauded it as a wise application of public
policy.6 Others explained it on public choice grounds, suggesting that organized labor
combined with incumbent management to grab rents from widely dispersed
shareholders.7 But whether these stakeholder statutes will be rigorously enforced in
the future, or perhaps repealed, is harder to say.
Still, predicting the future can be fun. In the short run, no one can prove a scholar
wrong about future predictions. The only immediate test is one of credibility: Will
anyone pay attention to the predictions, worry about them, or rely on them? This
depends in part on whether the predictions are vague or precise. Vague predictions
often can be ignored. More precise predictions should be prepared for, if plausible.
In the longer run, clear predictions are a much riskier undertaking than the usual
academic task of explaining the past. The predictions, at least if made sufficiently
concrete to be interesting, can be falsified. Only some people are willing to harm their
reputation in this way. Indeed, one might hypothesize that scholars who are bold
enough to predict the future rather than explain the past either have little reputation
to lose or have high discount rates and so do not care as much about the future as
traditional scholars. This by itselfmight suggest that readers should notpaytoo much
attention to concrete claims about the future of employment law. The very act of
making clear predictions reveals that the person should not be taken seriously.
But the millennium is upon us, and it spawns the task of predictions. The last
millennium saw predictions of doom and the coming of Satan.' But the predictions
were surprisingly few and generally not taken seriously. The established Church was
not inclined to test its credibility by making concrete predictions that could be
falsified in a short time. Only fringe groups with less stake in the future were willing
to make bold predictions. So millenary predictions would seem to have one trait in
common: concrete predictions are only made by people with little concern for their
future reputations.
In short, when predicting the future one is either vague and conventional, or
specific and demonstrably wrong. Of course, it is possible to be both conventional
and wrong. Having acknowledged the risks of lacking credibility now and being
proven demonstrably wrong in the future, I begin my gaze into the crystal ball.

6. Ronald Daniels, Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism Be
Compassionate?, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 315, 349 (1993) (demonstrating that stakeholder
protection arguments apply most forcefully for employees, but only weakly for voluntary
creditors); cf.Katherine Van Wezel Stone, PolicingEmploymentContracts Within the Nexusof-ContractsFirm, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 353, 375 (1993) (arguing that corporate stakeholder
statutes "do not actually give employees any meaningful protection" and urging worker
participation regimes instead).
7. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, CorporateStakeholders: A Contractual
Perspective,43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401,405 (1993) (arguing that"the true purpose of these [nonshareholder constituency] statutes isto ....
benefit a well-organized, highly influential specialinterest group, namely the top managers of large, publicly held corporations who wish to
terminate the market for corporate control").
8. ROBERT LACEY &DANNY DANZiGER, THE YEAR 1000: WHAT LIFE WAS LIKE AT THE
TURN OF THE FIRST MILLENIUM 179-92 (1999).
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THE FUTURE OFEMPLOYMENT LAW
I. BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS FOR PREDICTING
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT LAW

To predict the future of employment law, one must engage in two rather different
sorts of inquiries. First, one must imagine how labor markets will evolve. Second, one
needs a theory of how law interacts with the economy in order to predict how future
changes in markets will change law.
A. Trends in Labor Markets
Fou major trends in employment markets seem central. I claim little originality
here. indeed, some of these trends are becoming cichas. To the extent I am novel
here, it will be in questioning the extent of the trends.
1. Globalization
As markets open and telecommunications shrink the world, the economy will
become ever more globalized. Synergies as well as competition increasingly will
come not only from neighboring companies or from neighboring states, but from
workers across the globe. The pace of innovation is accelerating, which implies that
a skill that is valued today may not be valued tomorrow.
2. Importance of Education and Inequality of Earnings
Education will be increasingly important to workers. The economy is changing ever
more rapidly. College education is designed to train workers, in a general way, to be
adaptable to change. Past labor markets greatly rewarded workers fortheir experience
or willingness to work hard. Those traits, compared to education and adaptability, will
be less valued than they once were.
American society has the largest income inequality in the industrialized world, and
(at least until the last year or two) that inequality is growing. Inflation-adjusted
income of the bottom eighty percent ofhouseholds has barely risen in the last quarter
century, while the income of the top quintile has exploded. The top quintile now
earns almost half the nation's income, and the top five percent alone earns twenty-two
percent of the nation's income.9
3. Workers Manage Their Careers
Globalization and the emphasis on general education imply that firm-specific skills
will be less important than before. While firms will remain large, increasingly they
willbe reluctant to hire specialized workers for implicit long-term contracts. The risk
of the world changing and the skills becoming superfluous will be too great for firms
to bear. Firms increasingly will place risk on workers. The worker who manages a
portfolio of jobs will increasingly become the paradigm worker. Learning the IBM

9. SAMESTREICHER&STEWARTJ.
LAw ch. 1 (2000).
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or Dupont way of doing things will be less important in the future than being
adaptable to a changing marketplace.
Whetherjob tenure is decreasing across the American economy is hotly debated by
labor economists.' Reports of the growth of the contingent workforce can and have
been exaggerated." Still, I predict that workers will move between jobs, occupations,
and industries more frequently than in the past.
Will this mean the decay of "modem manors," to use Sanford Jacoby's wonderful
phrase that describes welfare capitalism in which large firms provide a panoply of
benefits to a stable workforce? 2 Not necessarily, although the emphasis will shift
even within the large firm, and we will see workers rather than the fim being the
locus of many benefits.
C
4. Women in the Work Force
During the past generation or two, the proportion of working women has exploded.
In 1973, fewer than half of the women aged sixteen to sixty-four were in paid
employment. By 1998, more than two-thirds were employed. 3 By contrast, the
employment-population ratios for men declined slightly over this period, from 82.8%
to 80.5%.'4 Noted labor economists Ronald Ehrenberg and Robert Smith have called
the rise in the proportion of women working outside the home "[p]erhaps the most
revolutionary change taking place in the labor market today."' 5 In 1950 less than
twenty percent of married women were in the paid labor force; by 1994 it was almost
sixty percent. 6 The consequences of this revolution have not been fully addressed by
employment law, and it will remain a major agenda item for the future.
B. Theory of How Employment Law Interactswith Markets
Too often, discussions of employment-law reform leap from the litany of labormarket changes recounted above to analysis of specific laws that have or will be
enacted in response. But that leap ignores the complex relationship between law and

10. See, e.g., id.at 25-31.
11. Compare RICHARD S. BELOUS,

THE CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE GROWTH OF THE
TEMPORARY, PART-TIME AND SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE (1989) (arguing that core

employment is declining and contingent employment increasing), with Henry S. Farber, Are
Lifetime Jobs Disappearing?Job Duration in the United States: 1973-1993, in LABOR
STATISTICS MEASUREMENT ISSUES 157-203 (John Haltiwanger et al. eds., 1998).
12. SANFORD M. JACOBY, MODERN MANORS: WELFARE CAPITALISM SINCE THE NEW DEAL

3-10 (1997).
13. RiCHARDB. FREEMANTHEUS ECONOMCMODELATY2K: LODESTARFORADVANCED
CAPITALISM? tbl.6 (Nat'l Bureau ofEcon. Research, Working Paper No. 7757,2000) (showing
the employment-population ratio for women as 48.0 in 1973 and 67.4 in 1998, while the
comparable numbers for men were 82.8 in 1973 and 80.5 in, 1998), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/W7757.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2000).
14. Id.
15. RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABORECONOMICS 175 (6th ed.
1997).
16. Id.
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the economy. Before one can predict specific new employment laws, one needs a
theory of how laws respond to market forces. Developing such a theory is a big task.
This Article is not the occasion to debate Marx, Weber, or Durkheim. But I will
sketch the rival theories.
Some theoretical approaches emphasize that law is a superstructure that reflects the
underlying economic order. Others emphasize that the law tries to shape, deflect, or
divert the direction of the economy, sometimes successfully. The safest statement is
that law and social forces have a multidirectional causal relationship. But at particular
moments in history, law can be more or less reflective and less or more refractive.
Employment law has always been a patchwork of particular statutes and commonlaw rules. Some employment laws reflect or enhance market forces, while others
attempt to refract or inhibit market forces. The tension between reflecting and
refracting market forces has always been present in employment law and always will
be. Or, to switch the metaphor from light to water, some laws channel while others
divert market forces.
Employment laws sometimes "go with the flow." For example, some have
explained the employment-at-will doctrine as reflecting the needs of the capitalist
economic order to control the growing strength of middle managers. 7 Modem
defamation law in employment references, which gives employers a conditional but
not complete privilege to utter false and defamatory remarks, can be explained as an
attempt to improve the efficiency of job matches by encouraging references and
minimizing needless or harmful turnover. 8
In contrast, other employment laws try to divert or resist market forces. The very
first Anglo-American employment law, the Statute of Labourers of 1349,' had the
goal of stopping changes in labor markets. The Black Death of 1348 killed up to a
half of the labor force, causing great pressures on the English feudal system of static
jobs and compensation. The English Parliament responded by commanding that
laborers accept employment at pre-Black Death wages and threatening to imprison
workers that left before the end of the employment term. The turn-back-the-clock
mentality of this legislation is express,"0 and its long-run futility is clear.2" Modem
examples are the minimum-wage laws, which are commonly explained as reactions

17. Jay M. Feinman, The Development ofthe Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J.LEGAL
HIST. 118, 118 (1976). For a critique of this avowedly Marxist interpretation, see Andrew
P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of
Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679 (1994).
18. See J. Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulation ofEmployment Practices,65 U. Cm. L. REV.
115 (1998) (describing defamation law's attempt to minimize problems of churning, scarring,

and mismatching through controlling but not choking off employer references); cf Ramona L.
Paetzold & Steven L. Willbom, Employer (Ir)rationalityand the Demise of Employment
References, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 123 (showing why efficiency-minded employers might continue

to give references despite the (often exaggerated) threat of legal liability).
19. The Statute of Labourers, 23 Edw. 3 (1399) (Eng.).
20. "[Workers must] take onlythe Wages, Livery, Meed, or Salary, which were accustomed

to be given inthe places where he oweth to serve, the xx. year of our Reign of England, or five
or six other common years next before." Id. § I.
21. See generallyROBERT R. PALMER, ENGLISH LAW INTHE AGE OF THE BLACK DEATH,

1348-81 (1993).
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to the harshness of unregulated markets, which would allow workers to work for
near-starvation wages.
The reflect/refract schizophrenia of employment laws make it difficult to predict
how the laws will evolve to changing market forces, even if one is confident how
market forces will evolve. I predict, however, that in the next decade or more,
employment law will increasingly emphasize its channeling rather than diversionary
role. To a greater extent, employment law will be designed to help firms and workers
adjust to the major changes in labor markets, rather than be designed to fight the
structural changes themselves. In doing so, employment law will further emphasize
such issues as efficiency in the employment contract, cooperation between parties,
and enlargement of the joint-surplus pie between workers and employers. In large
part, this shift in employment law's goals itself will be a reaction to globalization.
More frequently will the argument be heard and accepted that a country cannot afford
extravagant employment-law protections when other countries are only providing
efficient protections. The "race to the bottom" argument can be overstated, but it will
more often be heard by policymakers.
Increasingly employment-lawpolicymakers will askwhether firms and workers can
afford the benefits or protections. This practice places a natural check on regulation.
For example, suppose workers value a benefit at one-hundred dollars that would cost
employers ninety dollars to provide. One would expect employers to voluntarily
provide the benefit (deducting wages by ninety to one-hundred dollars), thus making
a legal mandate unnecessary. Of course, it is hard for policymakers or scholars to put
precise valuations on benefits. But the absence of a voluntarily provided benefit
suggests that the numbers are reversed-workers value the benefit less than it costs
the employer to provide. Mandating the benefit in such a case harms workers. Their
wage will fall by one-hundred dollars, more than they value the benefit. To the extent
the wage cannot fall by the full cost, employers will have to absorb some of the cost.
This will make them less competitive than firms in other jurisdictions not subject to
the mandatory-benefit law.
In the United States and United Kingdom in recent years, there has been much talk
of a "third way" in politics?' The goal is to break the polarity between efficiency and
equity. Some declare that being fair is efficient. The flip side is that being efficient
is fair. Increasingly, I predict, this latter claim will be heeded. Paying workers their
value, andpaying attention to meritocractic claims, will increasingly be justified both
on grounds of efficiency and fairness. Well-operating labor markets produce the
largest pie. Increasingly lawmakers will respond to the idea that good employment
laws are those that help labor markets produce the largest pie. It is unfair to intervene
in labor markets to assist some while hindering others, if that shrinks the overall pie.
Anthony Giddens, a close advisor to United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair,
has emphasized the primacy of efficiency in the third way:
Public policy has to shift from concentrating on the redistribution of wealth to
promoting wealth creation. Rather than offering subsidies to business,

government should foster conditions that lead firms to innovate and workers to
become more efficient in the global economy.'

22. ANTHoNY GIDDENS, THE TImRD WAY AND ITS CRiTIcs 3 (2000).
23. Id.
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Giddens even uses a watery metaphor to make the point: "The state should not row,
but steer: not so much control, as challenge."'24 Prime Ministers Blair and Germany's
Gerhard Schr6der, in ajoint paper articulating the third way, likewise emphasize that
laws must enhance rather than thwart markets: "The essential function of markets
must be complemented and improved by political action, not hampered by it."'
Law will still have a role to play in a polity that responds to efficiency-based
arguments. Not all markets function well, and labor markets have well-known
problems. But employment laws increasingly will have to be justified as responding
to market failure, reacting to a situation where workers in fact value the benefit more
than it costs employers, though some market failure prevents employers from
providing the benefit. Such market failures include collective goods problems or
asymmetric-information problems. As I explain at the end of the piece, unequal
bargaining power is not a market failure and does not justify mandating employment
benefits.
This assertion-that employment law will increasingly be used to enhance markets
rather than thwart them-is merely a prediction. It could be wrong. Protectionism is
a common political reaction to the perceived threats of globalization, and a
protectionist surge could arise again. Much of that protectionism could take the form
of labor-standards legislation that would differ in spirit from the legislation that I
predict is more likely. The recent hostility toward the World Trade Organization
shows the potential power of the political forces resisting globalization.26
Globalization has been thwarted by protective policies before. The golden age of
globalization prior to World War I ended with a spate of protective legislation
enacted as a backlash to the unsettling features of interdependent economies. In their
instructive history of that era, Kevin O'Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson warn that
political backlash can occur if insufficient attention is given to the immediate losers
in globalization:
Politicians, journalists, and market analysts have a tendency to extrapolate the
immediate past into the indefinite future, and such thinking suggests that the
world is irreversibly headed toward ever greater levels of economic integration.
The historical record suggest the contrary.
... [The interwar deglobalization occurred because] a political backlash
developed in response to the actual or perceived distributional effects of
globalization. The backlash led to the reimposition of tariffs and the adoption of
inimigration restrictions ....
...The record suggests that unless politicians worry about who gains and
who loses, they may be forced by the electorate to stop efforts to strengthen
global economy links, and perhaps even to dismantle them.27
The noted economist Martin Feldstein has predicted another spate of protectionist

24. Id. at 6.
25. TONY BLAIR & GERHARD SCHRODER, EUROPE: THE THIRD WAY-DIE NEUE MIr=E
(1999), quoted in GIDDENS, supra note 22, at 6.
26. E.g., Linda Keene, Gas, Broken Glass anda City in Dismay, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 1,
1999, at Al5.
27. KEVIN H. O'ROURKE &JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON, GLOBALZATION AND HIsTORY: THE
EVOLUTION OF ANINETEENTH-CENTURY ATLANTIC ECONOMY 286-87 (1999).
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policies in Europe, caused by the recent creation of the euro and the European Central
Bank.28 To his mind, Europe is a larger-than-appropriate currency area, and a single
monetary policy throughout Europe will cause pockets of chronically high
unemployment. The political response, he warns, may be to blame the United States
and "it would not be difficult to imagine Europeans arguing that they should not have
to compete with American firms that do not provide the European-level social
benefits to their employees, [and] have longer working hours .... ." A protectionist
war would lead to policies that thwart employment markets rather than bolster them.

II. FUTURE TRENDS INEMPLOYMENT LAW
The last section made my major predictions. I identified various trends in labor
markets: globalization, the increased importance of education, increased workermanaged careers, and the great importance of women workers. I then predicted that
employment laws would reflect, channel, and capitalize on these trends, rather than
divert, resist, or thwart them. Assuming those predictions are correct, this section
highlights a few specific areas in which employment law will change in order to
promote efficiency in the workplace in the face of changing labor markets.
A. Just-CauseProtection
As workers become more adaptable and flexible, the need and desire to stay with
one firm will lessen. It will become a more common occurrence for workers to shift
jobs. One important consequence of this is that the momentum behind just-cause
protection for all workers will fade. Just-cause protection is critical only when the
incumbent job is clearly better for the worker than other jobs. A worker suffers less
damage from being terminated from a particular job that, with higher turnover, he
probably would have left in a few years anyway.
On the other side, employers will increasingly resistjust-cause protection. As more
highly skilled, educated workers dominate the workplace, employers will have greater
difficulty in distinguishing consummate performances from mediocre performances
by workers. Clear rules of workplace performance are harder to determine. With
telecommuting, even the requirement that a good worker shows up on time becomes
less obvious. Imagination, adaptability, and foresight are matters of degree. Verifying
before a court that a worker does not meet the standards of performance (which is
what a just-cause system requires employers to do) will become more difficult in the
workplace of the future.
In the future then, just-cause protection will benefit workers less and will cost
employers more. We will see less erosion of the at-will doctrine from common-law
courts, and the state legislatures willbe unlikely to adopt ajust-cause statutory regime
along the lines of the Model Employment Termination Act.3 °

28. See MARTIN FELDSTEIN, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK AND THE EURO: THE FIRST

YEAR 10 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7517, 2000), availableat
http://www.nber.org/papers/W7517.pdf (last visit Nov. 7. 2000).
29. Id.
30. MODEL EMPLOYMENTTERMINATION ACT, 7A U.L.A. 428 (1991).
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If this prediction is correct, then the United States will remain an outlier in the
industrialized world, which uniformly forbids employers from terminating workers
without just cause. What about the idea that globalization causes a convergence of
standards? In the case of grounds for termination of employment, I predict that the
rest of the world will move more towards the United States, rather than vice versa
(although I do not predict the adoption of the at-will model elsewhere; that would be
too extreme a development). Unemployment rates in the United States are
significantly below most other industrialized countries, and have been since the
1980s.31 Europeans are looking for ways to make their labor markets more flexible,3 2
and the best way to do so is to give employers more latitude in terminating workers.
Just-cause advocates in the United States have long had difficulty explaining why,
ifjust cause is a benefit that workers value highly, so few nonunion workplaces offer
it.33 If workers value job protection, a firm could gain a competitive advantage by
offering it in return for a lower wage. Why does the market not provide this benefit?
In the global era, advocates of employment laws will increasingly be called upon to
give an answer along these lines, for fear that otherwise the law would put firms at
a competitive disadvantage.
One explanation is that an asymmetric-information problem exists. If a single fu-m
offered just-cause protection, it would attract two types of workers: good workers
who happen to value just cause highly for reasons unrelated to job performance; and
bad workers who fear being dismissed under at-will standards. If it cannot screen out
the bad type of worker, the firm will be at a competitive disadvantage.34 Thus, the
explanation goes, workers value just-cause protections by more than it would cost
employers to provide, if only employers could determine who are high-cost users of
the protection. The mandatoryjust-cause protection will solve this market failure and
thus improve the competitive position of American employers.
While this explanation is of the form that increasingly is needed to justify
regulation, in this case it rings hollow.35 The cure of mandating just cause for all
seems worse than the asymmetric-information disease. Most just-cause advocates

3 1. REBECCA M. BLANK, No EASY ANSWERS: LABOR MARKET PROBLEMS INTHE UNITED
STATES VERSUS EUROPE 11 fig.1 (Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Public
Policy Brief No. 33, 1997); see also ESTREICHER &SCHWAB, supra note 9, at app. D (2000).
32. BLANK, supranote 31, at 9 ("In frustration, many Europeans have looked to the United
States, with its lower unemployment rates, as a model of labor market flexibility.").
33. See, e.g., Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Poisby, Just Cause ForTerminationRules and
Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097, 1097 (1989) (declaring that at-will supporters
"confront[] an immediate problem"). "In the private sector and in the absence of unions,
employment is almost always at will ..... Id.
34. For arguments along these lines, see Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient
Norms in the InternalLaborMarket andthe PossibleFailuresofIndividualContracting,144
U. PA. L. REv. 1953, 1958-59 (1996); David I. LevineJust-CauseEmployment Policiesin the
Presenceof Worker Adverse Selection, 9 J. LAB. ECON. 294 (1991).
35. See J. Hoult Verkerke, An EmpiricalPerspective on Indefinite Term Employment
Contracts:Resolving the Just CauseDebate, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 837,842 (1995) (drawing on
empirical evidence to argue for employment-at-will as the default rule in indefinite term
employment contracts).
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recognize this, and continue with fairness-based arguments for just cause.36
B. Unemployment Insurance
With increased job turnover, employment law in the future will increasingly be
asked to assist job transitions and ameliorate the harshness ofjob change. The classic
program to undertake these tasks is unemployment insurance ("UI"). In the United
States, experienced workers who lose their jobs through no fault of their own are
entitled to temporary, partial reimbursement for lost wages.37 The benefits typically
last up to twenty-six weeks, and replace fifty percent of wages up to a cap. 38 Benefits
are sometimes extended during periods of high unemployment.39 What changes can
we expect in the UI system in the future? The major thesis of this Article is that
employment laws will increasingly have to justify themselves on efficiency grounds,
and like any insurance program, UI has several efficiency issues.
Moral hazard is perhaps the most obvious efficiency issue with U. When people
are insured against the bad consequences of an event, they take less care to make sure
the event does not occur. Economists refer to this problem as the moral hazard of
insurance.4" Applied here, the problem is that UI benefits reduce the concern with
unemployment. Persons take less care to avoid being terminated, and take less effort
to find new jobs. Almost all empirical studies show that UI increases
unemployment.4" This is an expected consequence ofthe moral-hazard problem. The
greater unemployment is not necessarily a complete social cost, however. Because UI
cushions the period of unemployment, workers can afford to reject low paying jobs
and can wait for a better job match.42
The UI system already employs the standard techniques of deductibles and coinsurance to overcome moral hazard. Unemployed persons typicallymust wait aweek
before collecting benefits (the deductible), and receive only fifty percent of their prior
wages up to a cap of one-half to two-thirds the average wage (co-insurance).43 Since
1987, UI benefits have been taxed as ordinary income, which eliminates the distortion

36. Theodore J.St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates:UnjustDischargeReformHeadsToward
Full Flower,-67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 65-66 (1988) ("For most commentators, it is a matter of
simple justice.").
37. STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL, EMPLOYMENT LAW 709 (2d ed. 1998) ("In the main,
unemployment insurance is designed to provide temporary, partial wage replacement to
experienced workers who become unemployed through no fault of their own.").
38. Id. at 706.
39. Id. at 707-08.
40. See generally Y. Kotowitz, Moral Hazard,in 3 THE NEW PALGRAvE: A DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICs 549 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
41. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Ronald L. Oaxaca, Unemployment Insurance, Durationof
Unemployment, andSubsequent Wage Gain,66 AM. ECON. REV. 754, 764-66 (1976).
42. Id. (estimating that an increase in UI benefits from forty percent to fifty percent of
income would prolong unemployment by one-and-a-half weeks, but would increase postunemployment wages by seven percent, for men aged forty-five to fifty-nine who did not quit
voluntarily or return to their previous employer).
43. WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 37, at 706.
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between earned income and UI income.' Further, all states require beneficiaries to
search actively for work and accept suitable employment when found."5 While
protests are sometimes heard that these limitations on benefits unfairly put the burden
of unemployment on the poor, it is likely that they will remain in effect as UI
programs are increasingly held to the standards of private insurance.'
Experience rating is perhaps the most distinctive feature of American UI. The
system is financed by an employer payroll tax, in which firms that terminate more
'
workers face higher UI taxes than firms with better "experience."48
The degree of
experience rating varies considerably by state."' All states have maximum and
minimum tax rates, which limit experience rating."0 Employers already at the
maximum tax rate face no disincentive to terminate more workers, while employers
already at the minimum cannot reduce their taxes by retaining more workers." All
states give some benefits that are not "charged" to individual employers.52 These
include benefits to workers who quit rather than are fired, and who enroll in approved
training rather than actively look for work. Noncharged benefits can range from one
percent to thirty-two percent of all benefits.' The greater the level of noncharged
benefits, the weaker the experience rating.5
The argument for experience rating is that it encourages employers to offer stable
employment as well as to police the system for improperly awarded benefits.5 6
Imperfect experience rating provides incentives for "wait" unemployment, whereby
a firm temporarily lays off workers during a business downturn while planning to
rehire the same workers when conditions improve. The laid-off workers collect UI
but do not actively search for other work. In effect, firms using this strategy let the
UI system subsidize their workers during slack times, compared to a firm that retains

44. Id. at 718.
45. Id.
46. Joseph M. Becker, The Location. of FinancialResponsibility in Unemployment
Insurance,59 U. DET. J. URB. L. 509, 541-43 (1982) ("There have been many proposals to
modify the provisions of unemployment insurance so as to perform some of the functions that
would otherwise have to be performed by welfare programs.').
47. For a provocative argument that U1 should not only be held to the standards of private
insurance, but should become private insurance, see Michael B. Rappaport, The Private
Provision of Unemployment Insurance, 1992 WIs. L. REv.61 (1992) (arguing that a private
system would be better at overcoming the obstacles of moral hazard, vagueness-of-contract
terms, prediction-of-unemployment levels, and avoidance of catastrophes). While the private
provision of UT might be consistent with my market-enhancing thesis, I do not predict that it
will occur in the foreseeable future.
48. ADVISORY COUNCILONUNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOYMENTINSURANCE
INTHE UNITED STATES 73 (1995), quoted in WI.LBORN ET AL, supra note 37, at 713.
49. Id. at 78.
50. Id. at 73.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. WILBORN ET AL,supra note 37, at 717-18.
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its workers through good and bad times. Considerable empirical evidence suggests
that UI, with its imperfect experience rating, causes about one-half of all temporary
layoff unemployment, which in turn is about one-half of all job losses. 8 Imperfect
experience rating creates distortions between industries as well. For example, in the
construction industry, where layoffs are common, workers receive $1.66 in UI
benefits for every $1.00 in UI taxes paid by construction employers. 9 By contrast, in
the finance, insurance, and real estate sector, where employment is more stable,
workers receive only $.40 for every $1.00 in taxes paid by their employers.60
Greater experience rating would reduce these distortions between industries and the
social wastefulness of wait unemployment. As the pressures for efficient employment
laws increase, then, we might expect a push towards greater experience rating.
At the extreme, perfect experience rating is identical to mandatory severance pay.
Perfect experience rating would imply that whenever an employer lays off a worker,
its taxes go up by exactly the amount of unemployment benefits the worker receives.
Mandatory severance pay is unheard of in the United States, although it is common
in Europe.6' While UI is a program that receives relatively little criticism in the
United States now, I nevertheless could see it being supplanted first by everincreasing experience rating, and eventually by mandatory severance pay.
The difficulty with increasing experience rating for UI is that cases always exist
where it seems right for workers to receive UI, but the termination seems to occur
through no fault of the employer. In these cases, there is pressure not to charge the
employer for benefits. For example, consider the situation where one spouse quits
work in order to follow the other spouse who has accepted a betterjob in another city.
The UI system has had difficulty adapting to the rise of two-career marriages. If
turnover becomes more common in the future, we should expect more spousal quits.
Employers will strongly object to being.charged unemployment benefits in such a
situation, and yet the goal of assisting the spouse in the job search will be great.
Situations like this example will prevent the system frombeing fully experience rated.
Child-care issues present similar problems for UI and any effort to increase
experience rating. As the role of working women becomes more salient, the UI
system will be forced to respond. Suppose a worker misses work because of childcare problems and so is dismissed for absenteeism.62 While absenteeism is a classic
example of misconduct that ordinarily disqualifies a dismissed worker from
unemploymentbenefits, workers with child-care problems present a more sympathetic

58. Martin Feldstein, The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on Temporary Layoff
Unemployment, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 834, 834 (1978).
59. WLLBORN ET AL, supra note 37, at 718.
60. Id.
61. Compare Thomas C. Kohler & Matthew W. Finkin, Bonding and Flexibility:
Employment Orderingin aRelationfess Age, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 379,385 (Supp. 1998), with
John Pencavel, The AppropriateDesignofCollectiveBargainingSystems:LearningFromthe
Experience of Britain,Australia and New Zealand, 20 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 447, 481
(1999).
62. I present the situation in gender-neutral terms, but the burden of this situation typically
falls on women workers. This is another example of how UI is slowly adapting to the needs of
women workers.
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case. In McCourtney v. Imprimis Technology, Inc.,63 the court held that absenteeism

due to child-care problems should not be disqualifying.' The dissenting judge
complained that the holding put the employer in a catch-22 position of putting up
with excessive absences or paying for the resulting unemployment.65 The judge
emphasized that "other social welfare programs have been developed to handle the
child care issue," and that the UI program should not be burdened with it.' One
response is to allow the worker to obtain benefits, because she fits squarely within
UI's goal offinancially supporting workers who involuntarily lose theirjobs and need
time to find more suitable work, but not charging them to the employer, because it
cannot control the problem. By not charging particular employers with benefits,
however, this Solomonic solution reduces the degree of experience rating. The better
result would be to charge employers with the unemployment causedwhen they cannot
accommodate the needs of working parents. This would induce employers to
internalize the conflict between family and work and encourage them to offer
accommodation. I predict that the UI system will increasingly react to the increased
importance ofwomen workers and the increased salience of work/family conflicts by
forcing employers to internalize some of these costs. A modest way of doing so is by
charging employers with the costs of unemployment benefits when workers with
difficult child-care arrangements are terminated.
Another unique feature of American UI is that the worker must be entirely without
work before qualifying for UI.67 In several European countries, by contrast, UI
systems give partial benefits to workers whose hours have been reduced because of
slackwork.68 This encourages worksharingrather than layoffs. Some laborhistorians
attribute the American decline in work sharing and the rise in the use of temporary
layoffs during downturns to the creation of the UI system in the late 1930s. 691 doubt
this idea will catch on in the United States, however. It would be hard to distinguish
legitimate situations where work hours involuntarily declined from situations where
workers happily agreed to, say, half-time hours so long as UI benefits allowed greater
than half-pay.
C. Emphasis on Default Rules in ERISA and PrivacyLaw

Default rules, as opposed to mandatory rights and obligations, will become a more
important part of employment law in the future. Default rules often are better than
mandatory rules in enabling workers and employers to tailor individually their
relationship in mutually beneficial ways. Default rules also help workers to manage
their own careers. Thus, I predict that employment law will increasingly allow
workers to waive rights. Employment law will increasingly be seen as providing a
template that many or most parties will want. But the law will recognize that this
63. 465 N.W.2d 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
64. Id. at 725.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See SUSAN N. HOUSEMAN, JOB SECURITY V. LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY: IS THERE A
TRADEOFF? 3 (Upjohn Inst. for Employment Research, Staff Working Papers, Spring 1994).
68. Id.
69. Id.
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template cannot apply to all workers, and workers will be allowed to deviate from it.
1. ERISA Regulation
The trend towards default rules and employee choice is already seen in pension and
other benefits regulation. First, many fringe benefits and levels are now offered as
"cafeteria plans" or "flexible spending accounts," whereby individual workers can
opt for some benefits or benefit levels and reject others (in return for greater wage
compensation). 0 This option immediately allows workers greater control over the
fruits of their labor. Second, there has been a dramatic move in the last decade or two
towards defined-contribution pension plans rather then defined-benefitplans 7 Under
the older defined-benefit model, which is still the norm in the largest firms, an
employer promises a specific benefit, based typically on a fraction of final salary, in
retirement. It is the employer's obligation to insure that the funds are there to pay that
amount in retirement. Major sections of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act ("ERISA")2 regulate employers to insure that workers receive that promise.
These include detailed funding requirements?3 and
termination insurance if a defined
7
benefit pension plan cannot pay its obligations. 4
Under a defined-contribution plan, by contrast, an employer promises to pay a
specified amount into each worker's account each year. That amount will be invested.
But the employer makes no promise that a certain amount of money, or indeed any
money at all, will be available upon retirement. That depends on whether the
investments do well, which in turn depends on stock market performance. The risk
is now on the employee. With this risk, employees increasingly have the power to
direct where their investments are made.
A more extreme form of devolving pension risk towards the worker comes in
401(k) plans, which are increasingly prevalent.' Under these plans, an employee
decides how much of his or her salary should be contributed to a pension fund.
Workers who worry about the future tend to put large amounts into these plans; other
workers who need the money now put in less. Employers like 401(k) plans for
reasons wholly apart from the fact that,like defined contribution plans generally, the
risk is on the worker rather then the firm. After all, inefficiently placing risk on
workers will mean higher wages and higher overall costs on firms. But it happens that
workers who contribute large amounts into 401(k) plans are also better, more
conscientious workers. The desire to save for a rainy day correlates highly with other

70. See PETER J. WIEDENBECK & RUSSELL K. OSGOOD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 988-90 (1996).
71. WILLBORNET AL, supra note 37, at 774 (reporting that over two-thirds of pension plan
participants were in defined benefit plans in 1975, while fifty-eight percent were in defined
contribution plans by 1991).
72. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974,29 U.S.C. §§ 10011461 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
73. Id. §§ 1081-1086.
74. Id. §§ 1301-1461.
75. See RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, PENSION PLANS AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE 131-39
(1997).
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attributes that characterize a good worker bee. 6
2. Privacy Law
A second application of the increasing primacy of default rules will appear in
privacy law. Much talk has been made of the privacy problems of workers, both at
work and off-the-job.' Privacy protection claims range from drug tests to intentional
infliction of emotional distress."' Workers often complain of being constantly
monitored at work. In this technological age, supervisors can determine the number
of keystrokes per minute that secretaries make, can tape-record the conversations of
sales people, and generally make workers feel the oppression of Big Brother
throughout the work day.
Unfortunately for advocates of increased privacyregulation, the efficiencybenefits
as well as the costs of monitoring are readily apparent. In this competitive age,
advocates of regulation will have to answer why workers and employers cannot
decide the optimal level of monitoring on their own. Under the premise that workers
are in charge of their careers, they should be empowered to decide whether to opt for
a workplace with more or less monitoring, with the accompanying more or less wages
or other benefits. If the employer has clearly warned about high levels of monitoring,
workers will not be heard to complain about invasions of a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
Privacy law already reflects this emphasis on contract. In the private sector, at least,
workers rarely succeed in their claims unless they can show that the employer held
out the expectation of respecting privacy and then breached the expectation.79 There
are remarkably few private-sector privacy cases.
Public-sector workers generally have greater privacy protections. This distinction
between public- and private-sector rights will increasingly be seen in the future.
Government employers are not under the same competitive pressures as profitseeking private-sector frns. Two important differences flow from this. First,
government employers, not interested in maximizing profits, have less market
pressure to consider the value that workers place on employerprivacy. Second, in this
global age, lawmakers are fearful of making employers less competitive by imposing
unnecessary costs on them. This fear does not apply to government employers. Thus,
I predict that extensive privacy protections for government workers will continue, but
that these protections will not spill over to the private sector."0

76. Id.
77. See generally MATTHEw W. FINKIN, PRIvACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAw (1995 & Supp.
1999).
78. Id.
79. A well-known case that can be understood on contract grounds is Rulon-Miller v. IBM
Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). There, the court affirmed a judgment of
$300,000 for an employee who was fired for dating a worker at a competitor's firm. Id. at 527.
The court emphasized, however, that IBM had held itself out through internal memoranda as
a company that respected employee privacy. Id. at 530.
80. But see Samuel IssacharoffReconstructingEmployment,104 HARv.L.REv. 607,61617 (1990) (book review) (arguing that courts resolving employment claims of private-sector
workers routinely look to public-sector cases for guidance).
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D. MandatoryHealth Insurance?
One major distinction between the United States and most other industrialized
countries is in the provision of health care. Most countries use some form of
government-provided health insurance, where eligibility accrues on the basis of
citizenship or residency. In the United States, government-provided health insurance
exists for the poor (through Medicaid) and the elderly (through Medicare). Most other
Americans, however, get health insurance through employers or not at all. So in the
United States, then, health insurance is an employment-law issue.
The U.S. Congress has already enacted regulations about employer-provided health
insurance through ERISA. ERISA preempts almost all state efforts to regulate
pensions and health insurance and other so-called welfare plans, on the theory that
a single national law is required." The preemption argument is defended on two
grounds: First, a "race to the bottom" problem prevents states fromplacing extensive
benefits requirements on employers for fear they will leave for other, more employerfriendly states."2 Second, state regulation imposes large administrative costs, as large
employers would have to comply with different and sometimes conflicting state
regulations.83
In place of the preempted state regulation, ERISA gives extensive procedural
regulation both ofpension and of health-insurance and other so-called welfare plans,
as well as extensive substantive regulation of pensions, but provides little substantive
regulation of health insurance. 4 The procedural regulations, common to pensions and
health insurance, include notice and disclosure requirements. 5 This regulation is easy
to justify on market-channeling grounds, in that its purpose is to improve information
flows so that employees know the tradeoffs they are making when choosing among
employers and plans. Of course, even information-enhancing regulation can be
overdone, but the inefficiencies are likely to be less than for substantive regulation.
I predict, then, that the ERISA notice and disclosure requirements will remain.
ERISA also regulates pensions in a substantive way, through vesting, contribution,
insurance, and other requirements. By contrast, ERISA has few substantive
requirements for health-insurance plans. The result is a gap in regulation for health
insurance, because ERISA preempts direct state regulation and does not replace it
with substantive federal regulation. 6
A laissez-faire attitude toward employer-provided health insurance may .be
consistent with a market-enhancing or wealth-maximizing objective. Indeed, this may
explain the hesitation of Congress to enact substantive health-insurance regulations,
despite the hue and cry over the subject. On the other hand, unregulated health
insurance can suffer from substantial adverse-selection problems. Employers that
offer generous health insurance may be swamped by job applicants who are poor

81. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). See generally, WlU.LBORN ETAL., supra note 37, at 843.
82. Catherine L. Fisk, The Last ArticleAbout the LanguageofERISA Preemption?A Case
Study ofthe Failureof Textualism, 33 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 94 (1996).
83. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98-99 (1982).
84. WnItORN ET AL, supra note 37, at 843-44.
85. Id. at 843
86. Id. at 843-44.
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health risks. Lawrence Summers has sketched an argument whereby an economy
which mandates that employers provide health insurance is more efficient than one
87
that refuses to solve the adverse-selection problem and does not mandate insurance.
Following this argument, I predict that employment law in the future will mandate
that employers provide employees with health-insurance coverage. Details of the
program will matter, however. Small employers may be exempted. The legislation
must coordinate mandates for spouses working for different employers. Finally, the
law may allow opt-outs or add-ons in certain instances, in an attempt to overcome a
problem that free government-provided insurance may crowd out preferable private
insurance."8
E. GreaterPortabilityofBenefits
The American reliance on employer-provided health insurance has put great
pressure on the employment/nonemployment line. Extensive regulation is required
to police the line. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
("COBRA") 89 was enacted to force employers to offer departing employees the
opportunity to continue in the health-insurance plan for eighteen months, so long as
the employee paid the usual employerpremium.9 More recently, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accounting Act ("HIPAA") 9 was enacted to force the second
employer to accept new employees into the health plan, even if they have pre-existing
conditions that are expensive to insure.92 Both COBRA and HIPAA are attempts to
avoid the problem of employees being locked into bad job matches.93 A wellfunctioning labormarket would allow employees to move to jobs where they are more
valuable, without fear of losing health insurance. Because these statutes have a
plausible market-enhancing policy rationale, I predict that they will be bolstered in
the future.
The lack ofmandatorypaid maternity leave is another area where the United States
differs dramatically from international norms. The European Union has issued a
directive, for example, mandating that member states enact legislation that provides
for fourteen weeks paid maternity leave.' The new International Labour Organization

87. Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AEA
PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 177 (1989).
88. Sam Peltzman has made an analogous argument that "free" public schools lead to a
low-quality trap because parents, who in the absence of public schools would willingly pay for
high-quality education, will opt for lower-quality public education that comes free. Sam
Peltzman, The Effect ofGovernment Subsidies-in-Kindon PrivateExpenditures: The Case of
POL ECON. 1(1973).
HigherEducation, 81 J.
89. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100
Stat. 82 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 10,15,29,33,40,42, and 47 U.S.C.).
90. Id.
91. Health Insurance Portability and Accounting Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-19"1, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42"U.S.C.).
92. Id.
93. WniLBORN ET AL, supra note 37, at 877-80.
94. Council Directive 92/85/EEC, 1992 O.J.(L 348) 1. Article 8.1 directs member states
to take the necessary measures to ensure that workers "are entitled to a continuous period of
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("ILO") convention also calls for fourteen weeks paid maternity leave, up from
twelve weeks under its 1952 convention.95 The United States enacted the Family
Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") in 1993, 9' which requires employers to give twelve
weeks unpaid leave for childbirth (and also for a serious health condition of the
employee, spouse, parent, or child).97 The increased salience of women in the
workplace, I predict, will put great pressure on Congress to increase the FMLA
mandate. When Congress mandates paid maternity leave, however, the form of
regulation will have to change. A mandate that employers pay women workers who
go on maternity leave will create incentives for employers not to hire women of childbearing age. Almost all countries mandating health insurance, then, establish a state
fund financed by general or payroll taxes, and do not attempt to experience rate the
tax by charging higher rates to employers with many workers on maternity leave.
Why is experience rating of unemployment benefits a good idea, while experience
rating of maternity benefits is a bad idea? The answer is that the critical decision is
in the hands of the employer, in the case of unemployment, and the hands of the
worker, inthe case ofmaternity leave. Appropriate policy wants the employer to think
twice about terminating a worker, and the increase in UI taxes will force the employer
to do so. Appropriate policy does not want to punish employers who hire workers
who go on maternity leave, and so does not want an experience-rated tax.

IV. THE DECLINING RHETORICAL FORCE
OF UNEQUAL BARGAINING POWER

In the vision that I have put forth, employment regulation will increasingly have to
be justified as correcting a market failure or otherwise helping firms and the economy
remain competitive. Less persuasive will be arguments based on the concern that
individual workers have little bargaining power and thus must take whatever terms
are dictated by employers. I accept the characterization that individual workers largely
take terms dictated by employers, but the terms that employers dictate are themselves

maternity leave of at least 14 weeks." Id. at 4. Article 11.2(b) requires member states to ensure
that workers on maternity leave receive "an adequate allowance." Id.
95. See Convention (No. 183) Concerning the Revision of the Maternity Protection
Convention (Revised 1952), June 15, 2000, at http://ilolex.ilo.ch1567/public/englishldocs
convdisp.htm. Maternity leave shall be not less than fourteen weeks, id. art. 4(1), with at least
six weeks' compulsory leave after childbirth, id. art. 4(3). Cash benefits are required. Id. art.
6(1). If based on prior earnings, benefits should be at least two-thirds of prior pay (caps are
permissible). Id. art. 6(3). If based on other methods, benefits should be comparable on average
to 2/3 of prior pay. Id. art. 6(4). A member state whose economy and social security system is
insufficiently developed shall be deemed in compliance with the cash benefits requirement if
it provides maternity benefits no lower than those for sickness or temporary disability. Id. art.
7(I). The ILO's prior convention on maternity protection mandated twelve weeks' paid leave,
but the level of benefits was specified in less detail than under the current convention.
Convention (No. 103) Concerning Maternity Protection. (Revised), June 28, 1952, art. 3(2),
214 U.N.T.S. 321, 326.
96. Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (1994).
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dictated by the workings of increasingly competitive labor markets. This is not to say
that labor markets are perfect. I have outlined ways in which they fail, which include
such things as externalities, collective goods, and information asymmetries. But
unequal bargaining power is not a market failure. Increasingly, policymakers in
Congress, state legislatures, and the courts will see that unequal bargaining power is
not by itself an argument for regulation. My argument is not that unequal bargaining
power is a meaningless concept (although it is notoriously slippery).9 Rather, I argue
that unequal bargaining power is not a good reason for intervening in labor markets,
and that in the future its rhetorical power will decline.
For example, suppose a health-insurance plan exists that each worker would value
at one-hundred dollars and that costs an employer ninety dollars per worker to'
provide. In a well-functioning market, the pension would be provided as employers
compete with each other to attract workers. Wages would fall to cover the employers'
extra costs. 9 The law does not have to intervene in this well-functioning market in
order to have health insurance provided. Not all labor markets function well,
however. Adverse selection may prevent employers from offering health insurance
to all workers, for fear that they will be swamped with unhealthy workers. For
example, suppose unhealthy workers cost $270 to insure. Employers cannot
distinguish unhealthy from healthy job applicants, although the applicants know
which they are (and unhealthyapplicants, knowing their status, value health insurance
at $300). If so, no employer can remain competitive while offering health insurance
to all workers. Net social gains might improve if employment law intervenes in the
market and mandates health insurance."
The conclusions ab out intervention ornonintervention do not change ifwe now add
to the story the fact that the employer is a monopsonist with extreme bargaining
power over the workers. In the simple story (before we introduce the two-types-ofworker, adverse selection problem), the monopsonist will offer health insurance to
all workers. The motive is no longer the fear of competition from other employers.
Rather, the motive is to "exploit" the workers all the more by reaping another ninetynine dollars from them. The monopsonist, who by definition reaps all the gains of
trade, will trade in order to reap. It will offer a pension plan and reduce wages by
ninety-nine dollars. There is no need for the law to intervene to insure the provision
of health insurance. Now, the monopsonist may be unable to offer health insurance
because of adverse selection problems. But that is a problem of adverse selection, not
unequal bargaining power.
Reducing the rhetoric of "unequal bargaining power" will change political
discourse, for much ofemployment law uses it and the related concepts of"protecting

98. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, DistributiveandPaternalistMotives in Contractand Tort
Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and UnequalBargainingPower, 41 MD.
L. REv. 563 (1982).
99. The fall in wages would be between ninety dollars and one-hundred dollars, with the
exact amount depending on the slope of the supply and demand curves with and without the
health-insurance plan.
100. Adverse-selection problems in providing health insurance, using the numbers I discuss
in the text, are nicely illustrated in Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of
MandatedBenefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 177 (Papers & Proceedings Supp. 1989).
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the little guy" and "preventing employer exploitation,"as rationales for intervention.
But if my major prediction proves true-that employment law increasingly will
attempt to guide, channel, and enhance markets rather than thwart, divert, or
counteract market-then the decline of "protecting the little guy" rhetoric will occur
as a corollary.

